We explore the political acceptance of taxation in commodity markets. Participants in our experiment earn incomes by trading and must collectively choose one of two tax regimes to raise a given tax revenue. A "uniform tax" (UT) imposes the same tax rate on all markets and is fair in that it yields the same -but low -income to participants in all markets. The "discriminatory tax" (DT) imposes a higher burden on markets with inelastic demand and is therefore efficient but it is also unfair in that incomes are unequal across markets. We find that DT are unpopular, as predicted. Surprisingly, however, DT remain unpopular when they are both efficient and produce a fair (equal) distribution. We conclude that non-discrimination (equal treatment) is a salient fairness principle in taxation that shapes voting on commodity taxes above and beyond concerns for efficiency and equal distribution.
Introduction
This paper investigates the political acceptance of discriminatory commodity taxes. By discriminatory commodity taxation we mean a tax regime in which the consumption of some good i is taxed at a different rate than that of some other good j. We focus on discriminatory commodity (rather than income) taxation not only because it is not uncommon (e.g. excise taxes), but also because a case for the economic desirability of discriminatory commodity taxes is easy to make. The reason is that such taxes can be efficient. In the experimental laboratory, we vary the distributional fairness of discriminatory taxes to test when such taxes are popular with voters, as explained below.
To see that discriminatory taxes can be more efficient than uniform taxes, consider the simple case in which government wants to raise a particular revenue from commodity taxation, and suppose there are only two markets. Suppose that demand in one market is (own-price) elastic, i.e. demand falls strongly when the price of this good increases, while demand in the other market is inelastic (and suppose markets are independent, i.e. the crossprice elasticity is zero). It is easy to see that if the goal of the government is to minimize efficiency losses, government should tax the inelastic market more heavily (the so-called inverse-elasticity rule is a special case of the Ramsey (1927) rule) . 1 This type of discriminatory taxation is thus efficient (in the sense that it minimizes the deadweight loss from taxation) but imposes a higher burden on consumers in the inelastic market.
A common argument forwarded to explain why such discriminatory taxes are unpopular despite being efficient is that they often induce unfair distributional outcomes. 2 To continue our example above, suppose that the poor spend most of their income on consuming the inelastic good (food, say), and the rich spend most of their income on the elastic good (a luxury good, say). The simple inverse-elasticity rule discussed above would now imply taxing necessities heavily and luxuries lightly. The tax would be regressive as it imposes a heavy burden on the poor and a light one on the rich. This outcome clearly flies in the face of distributional equity.
1
The Ramsey rule essentially says that indirect taxes should be designed so as to cause an equi-proportionate reduction in the compensated demands for all commodities. Discriminatory taxes may not be optimal in more complicated settings e.g. when commodity consumption is complementary to labor supply (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980) , see e.g. Sørensen (2010) for a discussion.
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This paper investigates the political acceptance of discriminatory taxation in an experiment with consumers who participate in a democratic vote. Consumers obtain rents from purchasing units of a commodity in markets. They then vote on two tax regimes to raise a given tax revenue. The "discriminatory tax" (note that we use neutral labels in the experiment) is levied on the market with an inelastic demand only; the market with elastic demand remains tax exempt. The discriminatory tax (DT) is efficient but distributes the tax burden unequally between the subjects. In treatment LOW, it is the "poor" (participants who earn low incomes in the market) who bear the burden of the discriminatory tax. In this sense, DT is efficient but unfair. In contrast, the regime with a "uniform tax" (UT) is inefficient (it reduces total welfare more than the DT) but procedurally fair as it treats everyone in the same way (i.e. UT imposes the same formal tax rate on all participants) and distributionally fair as it yields the same ex-post incomes (i.e. UT eliminates inequality across markets and voters).
We find, unsurprisingly perhaps, that DT is unpopular. To test whether DT is unpopular because of the unfair ex-post distribution of income DT tends to generate, we run a treatment in which it is the "rich" (participants who earn high incomes in the market) who bear the burden of DT (we call this treatment HIGH). We find that DT remains unpopular even when it is both efficient and distributionally fair, and that voters at least initially are strongly biased toward UT. The reason seems to be that the "procedural fairness" of UT (treating everyone the same way) is salient to voters and this fairness aspect dominates concerns for efficiency or distributional fairness in the context of commodity taxation as studied here. With repetition, the effect of concerns for fairness is greatly reduced and most voters eventually vote in line with material self-interest.
Our paper contributes to a small experimental literature on voting to tax markets which can be thought of as a special case of the broader literature on endogenous policies and institutions. While experiments studying the properties of experimental markets are abundant (see Kagel 1995 for a survey) and experimental studies investigating voting and collective choice are common 3 , there are only very few papers available which study voting on market parameters, in particular taxation (e.g. Cherry et al. 2012 , Großer and Reuben 2013 , Sausgruber and Tyran 2011 . Note that this innovative combination of two institutions forces us to restrict ourselves to relatively simple market and voting institutions (see section 2). In a broader perspective, our paper also contributes to a literature on endogenous, i.e.
Experimental studies on voting on other topics in political science have recently been so numerous that a new, especially dedicated journal, the Journal of Experimental Political Science, has been created to publish related research. A recent example of a voting study is e.g. Markussen et al. (2013) .
4 democratically chosen, policies and institutions. In particular, we contribute to the literature that investigates how non-standard preferences shape voting outcomes (e.g. Höchtl et al. 2012 , Feddersen et al. 2003 and market outcomes (e.g. Fehr and Falk 1999) . Within this literature, considerable attention is devoted to studying the role of pro-social orientations (inequality-aversion, reciprocity etc.), only few papers have investigated the role of procedural fairness aspects such as non-discrimination, to the best of our knowledge (e.g. Bolton et al. 2005) .
Experimental Design
Our design combines a market and a voting experiment. The subjects earn incomes by trading in a market and choose how to tax market transactions by majority vote. Section 2.1 explains the market institution as well as the procedures and rules for voting. Section 2.2 describes the sequence of events and the feedback subjects receive during the experiment. Section 2.3 explains the experimental treatments and discusses our predictions.
Market and Voting
All subjects participate as consumers in markets in which they can buy units of a hypothetical good from automated sellers. At the start of the experiment, the subjects are randomly assigned to one of two markets and remain in the same market throughout the entire experiment. Both markets are organized as a uniform-price sealed bid/offer auction (see Appendix II for instructions). In every period, consumers bid for units of the commodity they wish to buy.
Market outcomes are determined as follows: Bids are ordered from high to low, all bids exceeding the uniform offers are accepted, and the last accepted bid determines the price for all units traded. Thus, the market clears at a uniform price equal the lowest accepted bid.
A buyer's payoff per traded unit is the difference between the induced value and the market price; the payoff is zero, if he does not trade. In our experiment, taxes in both regimes are transaction taxes, i.e. the tax only depends on the number of transactions, not on their value.
A tax adds to sellers' cost. Since automated sellers bid their true (tax inclusive) cost, implementing a seller tax of t shifts the supply function up by t. At the end of a trading period, consumers learn the market price and their earnings for that period. A new trading period begins and every consumer starts to bid again.
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Using this market institution has three important advantages for our purposes. First, the market is known from previous experiments to quickly converge to equilibrium predictions. 4 Second, trading in our market is simple and is easy to explain to participants, allowing participants to concentrate on the choice of the tax regime which is the main focus of our paper. Third, this market institution allows us to automate sellers which simplifies the analysis. The properties of uniform-price sealed-bid markets are well established in the literature; see Smith et al. (1982) or more recently Sausgruber and Tyran (2011) . This literature finds rapid convergence to competitive equilibrium in uniform-price sealed-bid markets if the following holds: (i) privacy, i.e. each agent knows only his own valuation (or cost); (ii) exchange follows the rules described in the main text; (iii) stationary replication, i.e. aggregate market supply and demand is stable for a number of periods; and (iv) deep markets, i.e. there are at least four buyers and as many sellers. Consumers have no incentive to bid their true value in such markets. Yet, convergence to equilibrium is remarkably strong because the consumers have an incentive to bid the price down to marginal cost. In addition, when there is excess supply, human sellers would have an incentive to compete.
6 50, and  i3 = 50 points. Consumers receive the same redemption values in every period of the entire experiment. A consumer earns the difference between these values and the market price per unit traded in the market. When there is no tax in this market, the supply curve (S 0 ) is horizontal at 30 points, i.e., the cost per unit is c = 30. Demand (D) intersects supply (S 0 ) at a price of p 1 (t 0 ) = 30 points and a quantity of q 1 (t 0 ) = 12 units. In equilibrium, where supply intersects demand, total consumer rent is Π 1 (t 0 ) = 560 points and every individual consumer earns a rent of π 1 (t 0 ) = 140 points. Consumer rents in points are converted into money at a rate of points 100 = €0.3 and paid out in cash to the subjects at the end of the experiment.
Market 2 (right panel) has inelastic demand. Again, there are four consumers j = 1…4 in the market. Each of them has only one redemption value at  j = 130 points (in all periods).
Pre-tax supply (S 0 ) intersects demand at a price of p 2 (t 0 ) = 30 points and a quantity of q 2 (t 0 ) = 4 units. In market 2, the total rent absent taxation is Π 2 (t 0 ) = 400 and every consumer earns π 2 (t 0 ) = 100 points, i.e. about 30% less than consumers in market 1.
Participants start trading in untaxed markets for 5 periods. After period 5, the experimenter halts trading and informs subjects that a tax revenue of given size has to be raised in each period for the remainder of the experiment by taxing market transactions.
Subjects are told that they have the choice between two tax regimes (see Appendix III for the voting proposal).
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The "uniform tax" regime (UT) imposes the same tax t u = 40 to transactions in both markets. 7 The tax increases the unit cost by 40 points and shifts the supply schedule from S 0 to S u in both markets (see dashed line S u in both panels of Figure 1 ). We chose the parameters such that the UT is distributionally fair, i.e. induces equal market incomes in both markets in equilibrium. In particular, after-tax equilibrium prices and quantities are the same in both markets: p 1 (t u ) = p 2 (t u ) = 70 and q 1 (t u ) = q 1 (t u ) = 4. The total tax revenue per period is T(t u ) = 320. Total consumer rents are therefore equal in both markets: Π 1 (t u ) = Π 2 (t u ) = 240 and all consumers receive the same rent in equilibrium  i1 (t u ) =  j2 (t u ) = 60. UT is thus a "fair" tax in the sense that it eliminates the inequality that prevailed without tax (pre-tax equilibrium rents per capita in the two markets are 140 and 100, respectively). However, UT is an inefficient tax in the sense that it reduces the sum of payoffs. 8 In fact, the sum of the after-tax consumer 6
In our experiment, tax receipts are wasted. For experiments that use tax receipts for providing public goods or redistribution see, for instance, Güth and Mackscheidt (1984) and Güth at al. (2005) .
7 rents and the tax revenue (Π 1 (t u ) + Π 2 (t u ) + T(t u ) = 800) is smaller than the sum of consumer rents before tax (Π 1 (t 0 ) + Π 2 (t 0 ) = 960). This deadweight-loss (DWL(t u ) = 960 -800 = 160) arises because buyers in the elastic market 1 are forced to reduce their consumption as they no longer can profitably trade their low-valuation units at the after-tax gross price.
The "discriminatory tax" regime (DT) imposes a tax t d2 = 80 on transactions in the inelastic market 2 and leaves transactions in the elastic market 1 untaxed (t d1 = 0). The aftertax supply (S d ) in market 2 shifts vertically to c + t d = 110 (see solid line S d in the right panel of Figure 1 ). The after-tax equilibrium price is p 2 (t d ) = 110 and consumer rents in this market shrink to Π 2 (t d ) = 80. Because market 1 remains untaxed (and because markets are independent), outcomes remain at the initial levels in market 1, i.e., p 1 (t 0 ) = 30 and q 1 (t 0 ) = 12.
Total revenue from imposing the discriminatory tax on market 2 is T(t d ) = 320, which is exactly the same as under the uniform tax. DT differs from UT both with respect to equality of incomes and with respect to efficiency. While UT eliminates income inequality (compared to the untaxed state), DT exacerbates it (per capita equilibrium rents are 140 and 20 in market 1 and 2, respectively). But DT is more efficient than UT. DT avoids distortions of market outcomes, i.e., the tax does not reduce total welfare:
Voting is organized such that the four consumers in market 1 and the four consumers in market 2 simultaneously vote between the two alternatives. Voting is compulsory (no abstentions) and costless. Simple majority decides. In case of a tie (4:4 votes) the uniform tax serves as the default, i.e., the discriminatory tax DT is imposed only if it wins a majority of votes (i.e., 5 or more). 9 The instructions tell the subjects that the tax will add to the cost of the sellers. We explicitly inform the subjects that a seller will accept a bid only of it equals or exceeds the seller's cost plus the tax which applies in the market. With this feature of the design, the subjects can easily anticipate that the tax adds to the pre-tax market price. Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of phases in our design. An experimental session has 10 main phases with taxation which follow the phase 0 without taxation. Each main phase consist of a vote and a subsequent trading in the market.
Sequence and feedback

9
We chose not to break ties randomly to obtain a sharper statistical comparison of acceptance rates across treatments by removing noise.
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In phase 0, the consumers learn the total number of transactions in their market and the market price after each trading period. They also receive information about their period earnings and the number of their individual transactions. In the main phases (phase 1 and later), participants first vote on the two tax regimes.
As feedback from voting, subjects learn the total number of votes for each alternative; they do not learn whether the votes for a particular alternative come from their own or the other market. The outcome of the vote is binding for trading in the next 5 market periods. This procedure is repeated 10 times, i.e. every subject votes 10 times.
At the end of each period in the main phases, subjects learn the market price and the total quantity traded in their market. They receive information about the number of own trades and own profit. At the end of a main phase, subjects in addition learn how the regime affected other participants in their own market, in the other market, and in both markets as a whole. In particular, the subjects are reminded of the tax that applies in a given market and they are informed about the corresponding average per-capita earnings over the last 5 periods in their own market, in the other market. In addition, subjects learn the per-capita tax payments and earnings averaged over both markets over the last 5 periods. Provided that there is some variation in aggregate voting outcomes, subjects can use this information to compare the welfare cost of taxation. To make this information more salient and to facilitate comparisons across tax regimes, subjects are required to copy the information on the feedback screen on a separate form at the end of each phase. We note however, that buyers ex ante have incomplete information about the distribution of the tax burden between the markets. The information conditions in our experiment are common to market experiments and mimic the fact that participants possess only private information about market parameters.
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Consequently, buyers have to anticipate the effects of taxation with uncertainty, but they can learn to the extent that they gain informative experience.
Treatments
The design has two treatments. Treatment LOW implements the parameters as described in the previous section (see Figure 1 ). Treatment HIGH is the same as LOW but increases the redemption values of the four consumers in market 2 from  j(LOW) = 130 to  j(HIGH) = 250.
Because this increase does not change equilibrium prices and quantities in either market, this increase simply implies that the consumers in market 2 have higher incomes in equilibrium in HIGH than in LOW (hence the treatment labels).
The purpose of the treatment variation is to test whether the reason for the (expected) low popularity of efficient commodity taxes is to be found in the distributional inequality it typically involves. If so, we should see that the discriminatory tax DT is more popular in HIGH than in LOW. The reason is that DT is both efficient and "fair" (in the sense of burdening "rich" voters more and eliminating income inequality across all participants) in HIGH but is efficient and "unfair" (in the sense of increasing income inequality) in LOW. Table 1 shows the payoff consequences of the tax regimes in the two treatments. The numbers in the cells are the equilibrium rent in points per consumer and period. In section 3
we show that the markets in our experiment quickly converge to the equilibrium predictions.
The numbers in Table 1 therefore closely approximate the per-period earnings of subjects in our experiment.
In treatment LOW, the uniform tax equalizes after-tax earnings at a level of 60 points, see column (2) of the table. In contrast, consumers earn 140 points in market 1 and 20 points in market 2 under the discriminatory tax, see column (3) of the table. Notice again that the uniform tax is inefficient: the sum of rents is smaller under UT than DT.
In treatment HIGH, under the uniform tax consumers earn 60 points in market 1 and 180 points in market 2 (see column 5). Now it is the discriminatory tax that equalizes the rents between the markets at 140 points (see column (6) of Table 1 ). Note that, except for the higher rents of consumers in market 2, treatments LOW and HIGH are identical. In particular, the welfare loss from uniform as compared to discriminatory taxation is held constant at 160 points, or 50% of the tax revenue, across treatments. 
Discussion of the Design
According to standard economics, the discriminatory tax is (narrowly) rejected in both treatments. Assuming that all voters are rational and self-interested and vote sincerely, the votes will be tied because material interests of the voters conflict across markets. Consumers in market 1 earn less under uniform taxation (UT) than with DT whereas the opposite is true for consumers in market 2 (see Table 1 ). All voters in market 1 are thus predicted to vote for DT, and none vote for DT (but all for UT) in market 2. 10 A tie therefore occurs at 4:4 votes, and given our voting rule, the uniform tax UT will be implemented as the default. The information conditions of the experiment are sufficient to predict voting of rational and selfinterested subjects. 11 The same predictions apply for both treatments.
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The predictions discussed above are derived using the assumption of rational and selfinterested agents who do not harbor concerns for fairness or efficiency in and of itself. But it is easy to think of non-standard, social preferences that may tip these predictions toward an efficient outcome (for a recent survey of experimental results regarding social preferences, see Cooper and Kagel 2013) . Below, we discuss aversion to inequality, a taste for efficiency, and a preference for "fair treatment" (avoiding active discrimination) as additional motivations that may influence the popularity of the tax regimes.
First, support for discriminatory taxation can be rationalized by assuming a concern for equal distribution. To illustrate, suppose that subjects are averse to inequality in the distribution of after-tax market incomes (e.g. Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000) . In LOW, equilibrium payoffs in the two markets are the same under UT and different under DT. In HIGH, the opposite is true. Therefore, if subjects have a plain taste for equality, one may expect higher support for the discriminatory tax in HIGH than LOW. The prediction based on inequality aversion is subtle, though. To see this, note that consumers in market 1 who care for equality would have to give up 80 points for themselves to avoid a loss of 40 points for consumers in market 2. Such highly costly choices are empirically implausible and it is unlikely that the consumers in market 1 support the uniform tax because of inequality aversion (see e.g. Blanco et al. 2011) . 12 Inequality-aversion motives are more plausible to make a difference for voting of consumers in market 2. For them, the material self-interest overlaps with a preference for equality in LOW, whereas the two motives pull in opposite directions in HIGH. Hence, inequality aversion on behalf of voters in market 2 implies that the discriminatory tax receives more support in HIGH than in LOW. This argument may matter for aggregate voting outcome because the standard model predicts a close defeat of the discriminatory tax. Under these conditions, a few fairness-minded voters from market 2 suffice to tip the balance (see Tyran and Sausgruber 2005 and Höchtl et al. 2012 ).
Second, a taste for efficiency in the sense of maximizing total market rents is an obvious candidate to rationalize support for DT. For example, a pivotal voter in market 2 who reasons. In particular, buyers learn from experience with trading in phase 0 that bids are rejected if they fall below the sellers' unit cost, and buyers are told that the tax adds to this cost. Because the unit cost is constant, buyers typically experience a loss in earnings in response to a reduction of quantity traded in the market. Furthermore, the proposed taxes are large; they are particularly large enough to outsize even unusually large deviations from competitive equilibrium predictions.
12 supports the discriminatory tax loses 40 points, but another voter in market 1 gains more (80 points) which means that total market rents go up. In our design, a taste for efficiency would therefore bias choices in favor of the discriminatory tax. 13 Such a taste can be modeled in various ways. For example, Charness and Rabin (2002) assume that a subject's utility does not only depend on its own payoff, but also on the minimum of payoffs in a reference group, as well as on the sum of payoffs in this group. A concern for efficiency has received some empirical support in experimental studies, e.g. by Engelmann and Strobel (2004) in simple distributional games and by Kerschbamer et al. (2013) in markets for credence goods.
14 Finally, there is a growing number of studies in economics suggesting that people not only care about outcomes of their interactions but also about the fairness of procedures (see, e.g., Babcock et al. 1995 , Bolton et al. 2005 , Chlaß et al. 2009 , Krawczyk 2011 , and Güth et al. 2013 . 15 In our design, subjects are randomly assigned to markets and to different redemption values which implies random differences in equilibrium rents. One might therefore consider the pre-tax allocation as procedurally fair because everyone has the same chance to be member of market 1 or 2. Moreover, many voters may find it difficult to judge the fairness of outcomes in early votes, when information is still incomplete. In this case, voting for the discriminatory tax would discriminate against the consumers in market 2 and a taste for procedural fairness could bias voting in favor of the uniform tax.
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Results
In total, 192 undergraduate student subjects from the University of Innsbruck participated in our experiment, and about two thirds of them had some basic background in economics. We ran 12 pairs of markets in treatment LOW and 12 pairs in treatment HIGH. Each pair consisted of 8 subjects who were randomly assigned to market 1 or market 2. The experiment was split into 12 sessions with 16 subjects each. A typical session lasted for about 90 minutes.
13 Note that the bias would exist irrespective of the treatments because the treatments do not change the marginal incentives to choose one alternative over the other. 14 Note that in our setup, maximin-preferences (according to which people also care about the poorest member in society) would result in the same deviation from opportunistic behavior as inequality aversion because all consumers within a market earn the same income. 15 Considerable research on procedural justice and legitimacy is available in law and social psychology. See, for example, Tyler and Lind (2000) . In the context of taxation, Wenzel (2002) finds that perceptions of procedural fairness also matter for tax compliance. 16 Again, marginal incentives do not vary the treatments and a concern for procedural fairness can therefore not explain differential voting across treatments.
13
On average, a subject earned € 20, including a show-up fee of € 4. The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007 ).
We present our results as follows. Section 3.1 essentially shows that markets converged very well to equilibrium predictions and that welfare consequences of the tax regimes are as theoretically expected. Section 3.2 essentially shows that the uniform tax (UT) was more popular than predicted but that voting converged to the standard theory prediction with repetition. Section 3.3 discusses learning from experience and section 3.4 provides a broad discussion of results.
Market Outcomes
Figure 3 shows transaction prices over time, averaged over all 24 markets of each type. When markets 1 remain untaxed (in phase 0 or because DT is accepted in the main phases) the predicted price is p 1 (t 0 ) = 30 (see Figure 1 ). In markets with a uniform tax, the predicted prices are p 1 (t u ) = p 2 (t u ) = 70 for both markets 1 and 2. Finally, in markets 2 with the discriminatory tax implemented the price prediction is p 2 (t d ) = 110. The figure reveals that realized transaction prices quickly converge (by design from above) to these predictions.
Quantity traded also quickly converges to equilibrium. For example, in the final period of phase 0 buyers exploit between 93% and 95% of all opportunities to trade at a surplus in market 1 and market 2, respectively.
When realized prices and quantities are close to equilibrium, so are rents. In treatment LOW, the average earnings across all periods and subjects in market 1 are 129.2 points with the DT and 53.4 points with UT. The respective numbers for market 2 are 56.1 and 16.5 points. In HIGH, the average earnings in market 1 are 130.5 and 54.7 points with DT and UT, respectively. In market 2 the respective numbers are 171.1 and 131.1 points. These numbers are sufficiently close to the equilibrium predictions (see Table 1 ) such that our discussion of predictions for voting which was based on equilibrium considerations need not be reconsidered given the realized values. In particular, a materially self-interested voter would always prefer the discriminatory tax in market 1 and reject it in market 2, and this is true in both treatments. Table 2 shows the share of individual votes for the two tax regimes by market in the first two columns of each panel. The third column shows aggregate acceptance rates, i.e. the share of referenda that lead to acceptance of the discriminatory tax (DT), averaged over all phases.
Voting Outcomes
Overall, two facts stand out. First, as predicted by standard assumptions, DT generally receives strong support from voters in market 1 and weak support from voters in market 2.
Conversely, the uniform tax (UT) is more popular in market 2 than 1. Second, many votes are inconsistent with self-interested voting. This is particularly the case in market 1. For example, 31% of voters in market 1 in treatment LOW vote against their material self-interest by supporting UT (which yields an equilibrium payoff of 60 rather than 140 as with DT).
Our hypothesis is that making the efficient DT also distributionally fair and imposing the burden on the "rich" (in treatment HIGH) increases the popularity of DT. In our discussion in section 2.4 we have argued that inequality aversion is unlikely to matter for voting in market 1, as for them in LOW voting for the uniform tax (i.e., voting in line with inequality aversion) is very costly in own monetary terms. The question is then why the uniform tax nonetheless is popular for many voters in market 1. DT, respectively). This result is surprising: it holds although UT is more costly in own monetary terms for voters in market 1 than is DT for voters in market 2; in addition, it holds irrespective of which tax regime leads to equal after-tax incomes. This observation implies that the uniform tax is appealing to many subjects irrespective of its effects on the level and 18 One-sided two-sample test of proportions.
16 distribution of after-tax incomes. Procedural fairness perceptions are a likely candidate to explain this pattern. Figure 4 shows that there is a pronounced bias toward the uniform tax (UT) early in the experiment, but that this bias is almost eliminated by the end of the experiment. In our experiment, subjects voted 10 times on the same tax proposal. Figure 4 shows the individual and aggregate approval rates per phase, market and treatment (Appendix I shows the raw data of this figure) . Recall that based on material self-interest, 100% of votes in market 1 and 0% in market 2 should be in favor of DT. The most striking observation from Figure 4 is the large discrepancy of this prediction for voters in market 1 in the early phases of the experiment. 
Market 1 Market 2 Aggregate
LOW HIGH
Phase
In market 2, voting behavior that is inconsistent with standard predictions could be explained by a concern for efficiency as well as errors. Note that inequality aversion is unlikely to drive non-egoistic voting on behalf of voters in market 2, as then approval rates would be higher in HIGH than in LOW. 19 Generally, voting is closer to the benchmark prediction in market 2 than in market 1. 20 Again, this observation indicates that voting is biased toward the uniform tax.
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Why does the bias toward the uniform tax decrease with repetition? One possible explanation is that subjects initially care more about the norm of treating everyone alike because, absent explicit information about market outcomes, the procedural fairness norm is more salient. As the experiment proceeds, subjects receive feedback that emphasizes the consequence of the tax on market outcomes, in particular, the level and distribution of incomes across the two markets. We believe that as this information becomes more salient, the behavioral relevance of procedural fairness norm erodes. 
Effects of Informative Experience
Our results show that voting is biased toward treating everyone in the same way, i.e. taxing uniformly, perhaps because voters think about taxing everyone equally as an aspect of procedural fairness. We have arrived at this conclusion because we find that voters deviate by more from the benchmark prediction in market 1 than in market 2 irrespective of the level and distribution of market rents across treatments. This bias towards uniform taxation is more pronounced in early phases than after subjects have gained some experience. In what follows, we therefore discuss how feedback and learning from experience may have shaped our 19 We can think of two explanations for why voters in market 2 exhibit a lower acceptance of the discriminatory tax in HIGH than in LOW. First, there is some evidence that people who are rich relative to others contribute less to public goods (Buckley and Croson 2006) or donate less to charities (List 2011 ). These observations suggest that altruism may not be independent of status concerns. Second, the subjects in our experiment receive feedback about voting outcomes after each phase. Part of the dynamic we observe may therefore be driven by reciprocity. This explanation appears less plausible, though, because market-2 voters are less likely to vote for the discriminatory tax in HIGH than in LOW already in the very first phase of the experiment. 20 The difference is significant (p = 0.041, according to a WRS-test using all 24 independent observations from both treatments i.e., using voting decisions per market averaged over all periods). 21 Fehr et al. (2006) provide evidence that efficiency motives are in part driven by a subject pool effect according to which students in business and economics have a particularly strong taste for efficiency. In the light of their finding, the low and decreasing support of DT by voters in market 2 is all the more surprising. Our subject pool consists of two thirds students with basic training in economics, and one would therefore expect the taste for efficiency to be particularly pronounced in our experiment. 22 Roth and Malouf (1979) find evidence suggestive of this interpretation. In their experiment, players bargained over lottery tickets that determined the probability with which each player wins a monetary reward. In the first condition the players only knew their own reward; in a second condition they had full information about their own and the opponent's reward. Hence, the first condition highlighted procedural justice while the second condition put additional emphasis on allocation fairness. The result was that almost all players agreed on an equal division of lottery tickets in the first condition while the outcomes in the second condition shifted substantially toward an equal division of expected rewards.
18 results. However, experience is the result of (voting) choices, and because groups select into tax regimes, experience is endogenous and its effects cannot be interpreted as causal.
A first fact to note is that experience accumulates slowly and asymmetrically across groups. In phase one, less than 10 percent (2/24 markets) experience DT. By the middle of the experiment, half of the markets have seen both DT and UT, and the other half has only seen UT. In the final phase, three quarters (18/24) of the markets have experienced both UT and DT, but one quarter has never accepted DT. The subjects who have experienced both tax regimes can readily compare the distribution and welfare consequences of the two tax regimes and their choices can be taken as an informed expression of their truly preferred option. Yet, these subjects may systematically differ in relevant characteristics, such as tastes or cognitive skills, from those who have never experienced DT which means that simple comparisons will not reveal a truly causal effect. is somewhat weaker in HIGH, and there is also some deviation from self-interested voting in Market 2 (the dotted line in the upper diagram is above 0%). However, the net bias is clearly toward UT as can be seen by netting the vertical distance between the black line labeled "Market 1" and 100% and that between the dotted line labeled "Market 2" and 0%. Second, figure 5 suggests a strong and immediate effect of feedback on voting. Left of zero, when voters are inexperienced, between 37.5% and 75% of voters in market 1 vote for DT and there 23 Here is an illustration of how to read the figure: At -4 on the horizontal axis, for example, we see the voting behavior (measured on the left scale labeled "Approval of DT in %") of all inexperienced markets four phases before they implemented DT for the first time. At -4, the height of grey bars (measured on the right scale labeled "Number of markets" ) is 9 in LOW and 5 in HIGH. This means that there were 9 markets in LOW and 5 markets in HIGH who were inexperienced in phase t, but implemented DT in phase t+4. By construction, the behavior of the remaining groups who have implemented DT at least once after four phases (3 groups in LOW and 7 in HIGH) is indicated at value 6 (i.e., 10-4) on the horizontal axis.
is no clear trend. In sharp contrast, voting quickly converges to the money-maximizing choice when voters are experienced with both regimes, to the right of zero. Our analysis of experience effects confirms our previous conjecture that subjects initially care more about the norm of treating everyone alike. As indicated by Figure 5 , few markets accept DT already at early phases of the experiment (see the grey bars at the tails of the time line), and a sizeable number of markets remains without experience even for an extended period of time. As voting moves closely in line with predictions only once subjects have experienced the effect of DT, this result implies that voters who reject DT because they find it procedurally unfair have less opportunity to learn. This finding provides a first systematic reason for why a discriminatory tax may be generally unpopular.
Interestingly, neither procedural fairness nor any norm of outcome-based fairness seems to play a role once the subjects have received salient feedback on the consequences of the tax regimes. We observe that experienced subjects vote in line with self-interest in both treatments LOW and HIGH. As a consequence, the efficient tax gets rejected even when it is distributionally fair. One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that the cost of obeying a particular fairness norm is highly asymmetric between the markets, and voters are likely to learn that this is so. Experience, for example, has taught voters in market 1 that voting for uniform taxation hurts, as it imposes substantial costs on themselves. The disutility from bearing this cost is likely to swamp concerns for procedural fairness and equality. In contrast, voting for UT, i.e. voting in accordance with procedural fairness, is costless for subjects in market 2. For them, norms of fair treatment may unfold to an extent that overrides other norms based on fair outcomes. In any case, in our design only few voters with nonstandard preferences in the guise inequality aversion and a taste for efficiency would suffice to tip the vote against DT. If this does not happen in our experiment, it is difficult to believe 24 We use a linear probability model (with robust standard errors clustered in pairs of markets) and control for a time trend, a proxy for pivotality, a voter's past voting behavior and past profit (see Table 3 and the explanations given there for the variables). To test for potential treatment effects on experienced vs. inexperienced subjects, we include a treatment dummy and condition on whether subjects had DT implemented or not. 25 In HIGH, voters in market 1 observe that they earn less than voters in market 2. Hence, inequality aversion may explain why voters are more likely to vote for DT in HIGH than in LOW even absent any experience with DT. As discussed in section 3.2, the results of voters in market 2 are difficult to reconcile with inequality aversion.
21 that these types of preferences would increase the popular support of discriminatory taxes in situations where fair voters are much less likely to be decisive. This finding provides a second systematic reason for why a discriminatory tax may be generally unpopular.
Further Discussion of Results
We now explain that expressive voting may account for why some vote against their material self-interest (i.e. non-sincerely) and that expressive voting has an asymmetric effect across markets. This is so because of an asymmetry between voters in market 1 (voters1) and 2. In particular, because of the default rule we use, voters in market 2 are more likely to be pivotal than those in market 1.
To illustrate, suppose that voters in market 2 always stick to the standard prediction (they earn more with UT than DT). In this case, the DT is never implemented regardless of the choices by voters in market 1, i.e. voters in market 1 are never pivotal in this case.
Conversely, suppose that the voters in market 1 always vote sincerely for DT (they earn more with DT because they remain untaxed). In this case, every voter in market 2 can tip the balance and induce acceptance of the discriminatory tax, i.e. voters in market 2 are likely to be pivotal. Voting against one's materially preferred choice is therefore more costly in expectation in market 2 than in market 1 (assuming that utility is linear in earnings, this holds as long as the pivot probabilities are at least twice as large in market 2 as in market 1).
The key idea of expressive voting theories is that there is a trade-off between expressing support (i.e. voting) for some "good cause" and the private (expected) cost of implementing the good cause. For example, the act of supporting environmentally friendly energy production may give voters some utility but if the policy is then implemented and energy is indeed produced in environmentally friendly ways, its cost (in the guise of higher electricity prices, say) may easily outweigh its benefits to this voter. But the cost of expressing support for the morally worthy cause depends on how likely it is that a particular voter affects the outcome, i.e. whether he is pivotal (see Brennan and Lomasky 1993) . Voters would then be more likely to vote "morally" when they are unlikely to be decisive for the outcome, and the existence of sufficiently many of these voters may induce a "moralistic bias" (see Tyran 2004 and Feddersen et al. 2009 for experimental tests).
In the context of our experiment, both voting for DT (because of a concern for efficiency) in market 2 and voting for UT in market 1 (because of a concern for procedural 22 fairness) could be thought of as a "moral" obligation. Note that the cost of acting "morally" in market 1 are twice as large as those in market 2 (40 vs. 80 points) but that because of high pivotality in market 2, the expected costs of voting morally are higher in market 2. Therefore, the theory of expressive voting predicts more insincere voting in market 1. Notes: Robust standard errors (adjusted for clustering in pairs of markets) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Table 3 shows the determinants of the likelihood of voting for DT (more precisely, the marginal effects of a Probit regression) to confront this argument with the data. The variable Pivot p-1 indicates whether a particular voter has been pivotal in the vote of the previous phase.
We use this variable as a proxy for whether the voter expects to be decisive in the current phase. Specifically, the variable is set to 1 if there have been either 5 pro-votes including the own vote or 4 votes excluding the own vote in the previous phase, and set to 0 else. 47.7% * 40 = 19.1 in market 2 which is about 22% larger than the expected cost in market 1 (19.5% * 80 = 15.6).
We find for market 2 that voters who are pivotal are significantly less likely (by 7.1%) than voters who are not pivotal to vote against their material self-interest (i.e. voters are less likely to vote for taxing themselves when it is likely to hurt). This is not the case in market 1.
There we find no difference in voting across pivotal vs. non-pivotal voters. 27 Despite variable This effect is not consistent with a concern for fair distribution (voting for DT in HIGH produces an equal outcome).
28
Finally, Vote p-1 is the decision in the previous phase, Profit p-1 is the subject's profit in the previous phase; we include these variables as controls. Phase captures a trend over repeated voting, and Experience indicates whether the market had implemented the 26 Remember that subjects were informed of the total number of votes for each alternative. 27 This is not equivalent to say that there is no support of expressive voting. If we split variable Pivot p-1 into the two possible pivotal events (3:5* or 4*:4 previous votes for UT: DT, respectively, where a * indicates the tally that includes the vote of the consumer considered) we find a close to significant effect of pivot4*:4 for voters in market 1 (-0.083, p = 0.103) and a significant effect of pivot3:5* for voters in market 2 (-0.102, p = 0.006). Hence, voters from both market 1 and 2 seem to react to whether their vote has been pivotal or not. 28 See Footnote 19 for possible explanations of this effect. 24 discriminatory tax in one of the previous phases. These variables shed light on the dynamics of voting. As can be seen, voting is fairly persistent in both markets, but experience (and therefore feedback on the incidence of DT) matters for voters in market 1. In line with our discussion in section 3.3, these results suggest that in market 1 the support of DT increases with repetition mainly because of experience effects.
Conclusion
Discriminatory taxes are sometimes desirable from an efficiency perspective but frequently unpopular with voters. We have hypothesized that the acceptance of a discriminatory commodity tax depends on voters' fairness perceptions. To test this intuition we have
proposed an experiment involving voting on taxing market transactions. In one treatment the discriminatory tax (DT) results in an unfair distribution of incomes, in the other it contributes to establish fair market outcomes.
Our results show that in early phases of the experiment, voting is biased toward taxing all voters alike (UT). For example, among voters who have a material interest in voting for DT (because they remain untaxed), more than 50% vote for UT in the first vote. The details of our results suggest that this pattern is driven by voters' concerns for procedural fairness.
Many voters seem to dislike the idea of imposing a discriminatory tax on a subgroup of voters. We do, however, find that this tax appears to be more acceptable to (untaxed) voters when it hits consumers who are relatively rich. Moreover, we find that the procedural fairness norm erodes when voters are more experienced and receive salient feedback about the consequences of taxation on the distribution of market incomes. Our study therefore establishes the relevance of multiple fairness norms in voting on commodity taxation.
We think our results are rather surprising and our study invites further investigations into the topic. In fact, the choice of our design was motivated by the hypothesis (which seems to capture a popular view among policy-oriented economists) that efficient discriminatory taxes are unpopular because they tend to be distributionally unfair, and that such taxes would meet with more support if they were distributionally fair and imposed the burden on the "rich" (in treatment HIGH). Yet, the results did not support the hypothesis. In retrospect, we think the reason why the results of our study were hard to anticipate is that there are various social concerns in additional to distributional fairness that might potentially matter and cause a bias away from the standard prediction, and some of these biases may operate in opposite ways. In particular, we study a setting in which standard theory predicts an inefficient outcome, and in which some types of social preferences have the potential to improve efficiency (e.g. inequality aversion, expressive voting or a concern for efficiency) while others (in particular a concern for procedural fairness) tends to favor the inefficient uniform tax.
Given that our results suggest that referendum choices of inexperienced voters are importantly driven by a concern for procedural fairness, a useful next step would be to see how strong these concerns are in a setting in which standard theory predicts an efficient outcome and procedural fairness biases voting away from that outcome.
If our conclusion that procedural fairness matters in voting on such tax regimes were to prove robust under such alternative designs, our study has potentially important policy implications. Our results seem to suggest that the distribution of the tax burden is of secondorder importance in the fairness perceptions of voters. Rather, commodity taxes are politically accepted if they formally tax everyone alike. The reason, we think, is to be found in the salience of the respective dimensions of what is fair. The distribution of market rents resulting from commodity taxation is typically hard to observe in the field (unlike the distribution of incomes from labor say). General value added and sales taxes are close to the ideal that they treat everyone alike. The perceived fairness of this property may explain the rising trend of these taxes in the evolution of tax systems (for a related argument regarding the role of bounded rationality in shaping the tax system, see, McCaffery 2000). On the other hand, general consumption taxes tend to be regressive. Because the income distribution is skewed to the right it is often said that the tax increases inequality at the cost of a majority. 29 We have seen in our study that procedural fairness norms may eventually give place to distributional fairness considerations in such a case. 
